Corporate Cyber-Censorship: The Problems with Freedom of Expression Online by Rothschild, Max
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 
Volume 11 Number 1 Article 6 
1-1-2013 
Corporate Cyber-Censorship: The Problems with Freedom of 
Expression Online 
Max Rothschild 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/cjlt 
 Part of the Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, 
Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Max Rothschild, "Corporate Cyber-Censorship: The Problems with Freedom of Expression Online" (2013) 
11:1 CJLT. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Canadian Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of Schulich Law 
Scholars. For more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
Corporate Cyber-Censorship: The Problems
with Freedom of Expression Online
Max Rothschild*
I. CONCEPTUALIZING CYBERSPACE
. . . the Street does not really exist — it’s just a computer-graphics protocol
written down on a piece of paper somewhere — none of these things is be-
ing physically built. They are, rather, pieces of software, made available to
the public over the world-wide fiber-optics network. When Hiro goes into
the Metaverse and looks down the Street and sees buildings and electric
signs stretching off into the darkness, disappearing over the curve of the
globe, he is actually starring at the graphic representations — the user in-
terfaces — of a myriad of different pieces of software that have been engi-
neered by major corporations. In order to place these things on the Street,
they have had to get approval from the Global Multimedia Protocol Group,
have had to buy frontage on the Street, get zoning approval, obtain permits,
bribe inspectors, the whole bit.
— Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash1
The Internet is widely conceived of as being a public “space” or a medium for
public discourse.2 However, this understanding is misleading in that it obscures the
multi-faceted layering of private agreements that in fact constitutes the infrastruc-
ture of the Internet.
In order to get onto the Internet, users first have to make arrangements with
companies that provide access. Private companies facilitate admission to the online
space by acting as Internet Service Providers. Moreover, the content and services
that users can access once online exist by virtue of owners who host these elements
for “public” use. Companies like Google, Amazon, PayPal, Facebook, and Twitter
(to name but a few) provide content and services to Internet users as a form of
business. Although users are not always required to pay when they use these online
tools, they are nevertheless at all times engaged in business transactions. These are
regulated by private contractual agreements that users enter into — often implic-
itly — in order to use services that are easily taken for granted.
* Max Rothschild, JD, 2013, Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University. He holds
a BA from McGill University where he studied English Literature, Cultural Studies,
and European History. The contents of this article are current to April 2012.
1Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash (New York, NY: Bantam Dell, 1992) at 25.
2 Hillary Clinton called the Internet the “public space of the twenty-first century” during
a speech in February 2011: Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: The
Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2012) at 3074
[MacKinnon]; similarly, David Bollier argues that “People who contribute to the digital
commons . . . are engaging in a form of citizenship” and are called “netizens,” ibid. at
628.
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In this sense, the Internet is more accurately understood as a communication
tool that individuals access via a constantly-multiplying set of layered agreements
with corporations. Whether using a service like Facebook or Gmail or blithely ac-
cessing content hosted on a server, it is nearly impossible to use the Internet with-
out entering into relationships with corporate entities. These arrangements are pri-
vate and are on non-negotiable terms set by the owners.3 It is in this context that
users become vulnerable to abuse by the powerful corporations they have become
involved with as a necessary function of using the online world.
In the offline world we have become accustomed to enjoying various social
norms. Laws have regulated our relationships with the people around us such that
we have certain expectations about the quality of public life. Moreover, if others
fail to meet these expectations then we have the ability to enforce our rights.
Private contractual relationships are different in that they call for parties to
agree how they will treat one another. While social norms establish the parameters
of our public relationships, in private there is an extent to which we are able to
decide what rules we want to apply or not. This is important to keep in mind when
considering relationships with businesses since they are not obliged to agree to
many norms we take for granted.
When we enter into agreements with companies via our online conduct we do
so at their pleasure. Terms of service agreements are designed to limit liability and
maximize potential profit, and in almost every case these are non-negotiable. If you
want to use Facebook as a social networking platform then you have to agree to
Facebook’s terms of service.
Although there are many aspects of this one-sided negotiation that are dis-
turbing, of particular concern is the fact that these private contractual agreements
are outside the scope of international human rights law. Corporate entities as a
whole are free from the application of international human rights law as it currently
exists, and this problem has increasingly vexed scholars and activists for decades.4
As Surya Deva writes: “The era of legally binding corporate human rights obliga-
tions has not even properly begun.”5
The growth of the Internet’s presence in society in recent years has high-
lighted the problem with the applicability of human rights law. This area of law
was designed to regulate the activity of state actors’ control of their jurisdictional
3 “Uninformed Consent? Your Agreements with Flickr, Facebook, etc.” Interview of
Michael Geist by Bruce Ladan, (19 March 2012) on Quirks and Quarks, CBC Toronto,
online: CBC <http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2012/03/19/technology-audio-
user-agreements.html>.
4 Peter Mulchinski, “Corporate Social Responsibility and International Law: The Case of
Human Rights and Multinational Corporations” in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora
Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social
Responsibility and the Law, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at
436–439 [Mulchinski]; see also the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre’s on-
line archive of known human rights abuses by businesses, online:
<http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Issues/Abuses>.
5 Surya Deva, “Corporate Complicity in Internet Censorship in China: Who Cares for the
Global Compact of the Global Online Freedom Act?” (2007) 39 Geo Wash Int’l L Rev
255 at 319 [Deva].
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spaces; however, the growing importance of the Internet as a public “space” has
emphasized the fact that it is privately owned and operates within the confines of
private contractual law. In this context the corporate entities that enable us to use
the Internet are also largely unaccountable via their one-sided mandatory contracts
with users. These corporations not only hold all the power in allowing us access to
the Internet, our relationships with them exist in a space that makes them essen-
tially beyond reproach if they act in unacceptable ways.6
II. HUMANIZING THE DIGITAL
This article will explore the problem of the applicability of human rights law
to the corporate entities that own and enable the operation of the Internet. The focus
will be the status of the right to freedom of expression online, and the different
possibilities that have been suggested in order to ensure that users have and are able
to exercise this right. As the Internet is a communicative tool that allows for an
unprecedented global discourse, freedom of expression is naturally of primary im-
portance in the online context.7
The scope of freedom of expression is still evolving within international
human rights law8 and thus it is not easy to identify exactly what the right means.
For the purposes of this article freedom of expression (FOE) will be understood as
it is defined in the International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR), specifically two of
the constituting documents thereof: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights9
(UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights10 (ICCPR).
Freedom of Expression is provided for under Article 19 of the UDHR, which reads
that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right in-
cludes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and im-
part information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”11 That
6 Indeed, as Andrew Clapham has explored, “increases in the power of non-state actors
like multinational enterprises ha[ve] problematized the conception of corporations as
having no social/public obligations; these private entities should be subject to HR re-
sponsibilities, notwithstanding their status as creatures of private law, since human dig-
nity must be protected in every circumstance”: see Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in
the Private Sphere (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) at 137-138 and 147; see also An-
drew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2006) at 544–548.
7 Wolfgang Benedek, “Internet Governance and Human Rights” in Internet Governance
and the Information Society (Portland, OR: Eleven International Publishing, 2008) at
36 [Benedek].
8 Rhona Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (New York, NY: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2010) at 36 [Smith].
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, CA Res 217 (III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Supp
No 13, UN doc A/810 (1948) [UDHR].
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CA Res 2200A (XXI), UN-
GAOR, Supp No 16, UN Doc A/6316 (1966) at 52 [ICCPR].
11 UDHR, supra note 9, art 19.
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principle is given a more formal and practicable legal framework in Article 19 of
the ICCPR, which provides that:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be sub-
ject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by
law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.12
The ICCPR and the UDHR provide a good basis for defining international
human rights laws such as FOE because, “As of now, the [two documents are]
widely accepted as the ‘consensus of global opinion on fundamental rights’, and as
such, are therefore highly reflective of customary international law.”13 Further-
more, although the UDHR is not technically a formal treaty and as such is not le-
gally binding,14 the ICCPR is a treaty that theoretically commits its parties to be
“legally as well as morally bound” by the articles of the treaty15 (subject to any
stated reservations or interpretative declarations).16 As such, the framework pro-
vided in the ICCPR is a good indication of how the international community envis-
ages FOE. More broadly, the IBHR indicates both the underlying goals of human
rights law with regards to the freedom of expression, as well as the method by
which to implement this right.
This article will explore various methods that have attempted to bring the con-
duct of multinational corporations in line with international human rights norms,
with specific focus on FOE in the online context. It will be argued that despite
12 ICCPR, supra note 10, art 19.
13 Michael Koebele, Corporate Responsibility Under the Alien Tort Statute (Boston, MA:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) at 89 [Koebele].
14 Smith, supra note 8 at 37-38, in which she notes that the UDHR is sometimes called
“the conscience of the world” and describes its status as “variable.” Smith notes that
the UDHR “is not, by definition, legally binding,” but has arguably become “so widely
accepted that they form part of the general principles of law, although they may not
have crystallized into customary international law.” Moreover “not all rights in the
Universal declaration have crystallized into custom.” This is particularly true of FOE,
the scope of which varies dramatically from state to state, as will be mentioned
throughout this article.
15 Ibid. at 48-49; Smith also notes at 48 that despite the ICCPR’s widespread acceptance,
the rights enshrined “are still regularly violated worldwide.”
16 “U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,” 138 Cong Rec S4781-01, online: University of Minnesota
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/civilres.html>.
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significant resistance to the idea of instituting legal requirements at the interna-
tional level, there continue to be encouraging developments in the private sector
and in the domestic law of a few important jurisdictions.
It should be noted at this point that any discussion of international human
rights law and implementation thereof will be restricted to that which is aimed at
private business entities. Although the actual implementation of current human
rights law is only applicable to state actors, this article does not seek to evaluate or
problematize these applications outside of their relationship to private corporations.
III. ANARCHY ONLINE
The serious problems posed by inconsistent corporate behaviour in the matter
of FOE online will become clear over the course of a few illustrative examples.
This section will detail two sets of events that demonstrate the unaccountability of
multinational corporations who determine that is within their interests to engage in
Internet censorship. First, a timeline will be presented detailing the abandonment of
WikiLeaks by many of its corporate partners in 2010, as well as an examination of
the resultant legal consequences for WikiLeaks, its (former) corporate allies, and
the US government. Second, China’s censorship regime will be described and the
complicity of a number of multinational corporations in that regime will be
detailed.
(a) The Attempted Censorship of WikiLeaks
WikiLeaks is a not-for-profit media organization that exists “to bring impor-
tant news and information to the public . . . so readers and historians alike can see
evidence of the truth.”17 Since launching in 2007, WikiLeaks has exposed numer-
ous confidential documents to the public including bank records, government
cables, and videos of military operations. The organization has attracted interna-
tional attention for testing the limits of freedom of expression.
In November 2010, WikiLeaks organized a coordinated international publica-
tion of classified documents detailing hundreds of correspondences between the
United States (US) State Department and its diplomatic missions around the
world.18 The reaction from American politicians was vitriolic,19 and included Vice
President Joe Biden labeling WikiLeaks’ founder Julian Assange a “high tech ter-
rorist”20 and Hilary Clinton calling the disclosure “an attack on the international
17 Wikileaks, “About”, online: WikiLeaks.org <http://wikileaks.org/About.html>.
18 Angela Daly, “Private Power and New Media: The Case of the Corporate Suppression
of WikiLeaks and its Implications for the Exercise of Fundamental Rights on the In-
ternet,” (Ph. D Thesis, 2012) online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1772663> at 1 [Daly];
Yochai Benkler, “A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battler over the Soul
of the Networked Fourth Estate” (2011) 46 Harv CR-CLL Rev 311 at 312 [Benkler].
19 Daly, supra note 18 at 6; Toby Harnden, “WikiLeaks:US Senators Call for WikiLeaks
to Face Charges” The Telegraph (28 November 2010) online:
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8166607/WikiLeaks-
US-Senators-call-for-WikiLeaks-to-face-criminal-charges.html>.
20 Benkler, supra note 18 at 313.
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community.”21 Senator Joe Lieberman, the chairman of the Senate Homeland Se-
curity Committee, launched a campaign against WikiLeaks’ “attack on the national
security of the United States.”22 Senator Lieberman had members of his staff con-
tact various corporations that provided services to WikiLeaks, including Amazon
and Tableau Software, in order to make inquiries as to whether or not they would
be terminating their relationship with the media organization.23
Beginning in early December 2010, numerous corporate entities ceased to pro-
vide services to WikiLeaks. In addition to Amazon and Tableau Software, Apple,
Bank of America, EveryDNS, MasterCard, and PayPal all formally ended their re-
lationships with the embattled organization. Despite this widespread termination of
services, WikiLeaks received support from a number of international organizations
that allowed it to continue hosting its website and receiving donations.24
Some of the companies that ceased to support WikiLeaks gave reasons for
their actions, and many stated that WikiLeaks had violated their terms of services
via its alleged engagement in or encouragement of illegal activity.25 Most of these
corporations did not identify the US government as having influenced their deci-
sions to cut ties with WikiLeaks and Amazon explicitly denied such allegations.26
However, Tableau Software did state that it was prompted at least in part by Sena-
tor Lieberman’s public request for organizations hosting WikiLeaks to terminate
their relationships with the site.27 Likewise, PayPal’s VP of Platform, Mobile and
New Ventures later acknowledged that the actions of the US State Department
played a role in the company’s blocking of WikiLeaks’ account.28
21 David Jackson, “Obama Aides Condemn WikiLikes; Obama Orders Review”, USA To-
day (29 November 2010) online: <http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ the-
oval/post/2010/11/obamas-team-faces-sensitive-diplomacy-over-wikileaks/
1#.T2jA32JWoyc>.
22 “Lieberman Condemns New WikiLeaks Disclosure”, United States Senate (28 Novem-
ber 2010) online: <http://lieberman.senate.gov/index.cfm/news-events/news/
2010/11/lieberman-condemns-new-wikileaks-disclosures>.
23 Rachel Slajda, “How Lieberman Got Amazon to Drop WikiLeaks”, Talking Points
Memo (1 December 2010) online: <http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/
2010/12/how_lieberman_got_amazon_to_drop_wikileaks.php>; Daly, supra note 18 at
4.
24 WikiLeaks, “Donate”, online: WikiLeaks.org <http://shop.wikileaks.org/donate>;
WikiLeaks, “Banking Blocade”, online: WikiLeaks.org <http://wikileaks.org/Banking-
Blockade.html>; Charles Arthur, “WikiLeaks Under Attack: The Definitive Timeline”,
The Guardian (8 January 2010), online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/
dec/07/wikileaks-under-attack-definitive-timeline?intcmp=239>.
25 Daly, supra note 18 at 2–4.
26 Amazon Web Services, “Message”, Amazon.com (3 December 2010), online:
<http://aws.amazon.com/message/65348/>.
27 Elissa Fink, “Why we removed the WikiLeaks visualization”, Tableau Software (2 De-
cember 2010), online: <http://www.tableausoftware.com/about/blog/2010/12/why-we-
removed-wikileaks-visualizations>.
28 Bianca Bosker, “PayPal Admits State Department Pressure Caused it to Block
WikiLeaks”, The Huffington Post (8 December 2010), online:
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Many scholars and political commentators have critiqued the various corpo-
rate entities that terminated services to WikiLeaks, as well as the US government
for its role in influencing those companies. Some have likened Senator Lieber-
man’s “thuggish” exertion of influence over private actors to that of an authorita-
rian regime,29 while others have been more critical of the role played by the corpo-
rate entities themselves.30 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi
Pillay, voiced concerns over the termination of support for WikiLeaks, stating: 
While it is unclear whether these individual measures taken by private ac-
tors directly infringe on States human rights obligations to ensure respect of
the right to freedom of expression, taken as a whole they could be inter-
preted as an attempt to censure the publication of information thus poten-
tially violating WikiLeaks right to freedom of expression.31
Despite these criticisms and concerns about the violation of WikiLeaks’ rights,
the legal consequences of these events have been minimal. In terms of WikiLeaks
conduct, despite vague allegations that the website’s mere possession of leaked
documents violated US law,32 it does not appear that the publication of the leaked
documents was illegal. As Yochai Benkler has argued, the US government has no
case against WikiLeaks unless it can prove that the organization was directly in-
volved in the actual leak of the documents33 because the publication thereof is pro-
tected domestically by the First Amendment.34 The US government has yet to
bring forward any charges against WikiLeaks or Julian Assange, and unless the
United States Supreme Court is prepared to dramatically reinterpret the relationship
between the Espionage Act and the First Amendment35 it does not appear that
WikiLeaks is guilty of any misconduct in the United States.
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/08/paypal-admits-us-state-
de_n_793708.html>.
29 Glenn Greenwald, “Joe Liberman Emulates Chinese Dictators”, Salon (2 December
2010), online: Salon <http://www.salon.com/2010/12/02/lieberman_55>.
30 Daly, supra note 18 at 7-8; Michael D Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, “The Invisible
Handshake: The Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment”, (2003) 8 Va JL
& Tech at 8 [Birnhack]; see also MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 1484: “The response to
WikiLeaks’ release of classified cables is a troubling example of private companies’
unaccountable power over citizens’ political speech, and of how government can ma-
nipulate that power in informal and thus unaccountable ways.”
31 United Nations, “UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay voices con-
cern at reports of presume being exerted on private companies to halt financial or in-
ternet services for WikiLeaks”, United Nations News and Media (9 December 2010),
online: UN <http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/d/16541.html>.
32 Harold Koh, “Text of State Department Letter to WikiLeaks”, Reuters (27 November
2010), online: Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/28/us-wikileaks-usa-
letter-idUSTRE6AR1E420101128>.
33 MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 1490.
34 As demonstrated by the decision in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) at 730; Benkler, supra note 18 at 352.
35 Rick Stengel, “WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange Speaks with TIME,” TIME Special Reports
podcast, December 1 2010, available on the Apple iTunes Store, Julian Assange at
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If the allegations of illegal conduct are indeed false then the question becomes
whether or not WikiLeaks’ FOE was directly violated by either the US government
or unduly constrained by the corporations that terminated their services to the me-
dia organization. Unfortunately the answer to both these questions appears to be no,
as there is no evidence that the US government acted to directly censor WikiLeaks
and the corporate entities were acting under the protection of private contractual
law. The US government’s actions appear to have been an “extralegal private-pub-
lic partnership”36 that Birnhack and Koren have termed “The Invisible Hand-
shake,” whereby the State and the private sector collaborate in ways that are be-
yond the reach of judicial review.37 In this case the US government’s actions were
purely political in nature, and did not reach the level of an official exercise of state
authority.38 Meanwhile, the corporations that terminated their services to
WikiLeaks “were within their legal contractual rights to drop any customer for any
reason” and so do not appear to have violated any US or international public law.39
Thus WikiLeaks largely seems to be without legal recourse — or the financial
wherewithal to litigate against these companies — despite the fact that the actions
of the US government and numerous corporate entities appear to have constituted
an indirect attempt to suppress freedom of expression online.
(b) Multinational Corporations Operating in China
Further evidence of the unaccountability of corporate entities for actions in-
consistent with human rights norms can be seen by examining the actions of a num-
ber of US-based multinational corporations in China. Specifically, this article will
focus on the compliance of Google Inc., Yahoo! Inc., and Microsoft Corporation in
China’s Internet censorship regime.
Censorship in China is pervasive, despite the fact that the country’s constitu-
tion guarantees both freedom of speech and of the press and that the country has
signed (although not ratified) the ICCPR.40 China’s censorship of the Internet is an
enormous and multifaceted enterprise that operates on many levels. The first is
00:09:25: “When you talk about the law, what’s very important to remember is the law
is not what, not simply what, powerful people would want others to believe . . . the law
rather is what the Supreme Court in the land in the end says it is . . . Now whether the
Supreme Court makeup now is such that it keeps to those traditions, or it proposes a
radical reassessment of the First Amendment and the US Constitution remains to be
seen” (emphasis added).
36 Benkler, supra note 18 at 314.
37 Birnhack, supra note 30 at 3.
38 As such the state neither engaged in illegal censorship nor restricted FOE due to neces-
sity and by law.
39 MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 1466; however, it is possible that WikiLeaks could pursue
private legal remedies for breach of contract depending on the specific terms of their
agreements. As many of the corporations claimed that their terms of service agree-
ments had been violated based on WikiLeaks’ illegal conduct, it is possible that the
media organization could pursue private legal remedies by demonstrating such claims
to be false.
40 Deva, supra note 5 at 262.
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commonly known as the Great Firewall of China, and consists of a complex system
of both hardware and software measures. These measures control what data flows
from outside China to its Internet Access Providers, then to local Internet Service
Providers, and finally to Chinese users. Blocking and filtration at both the access
and service provision levels allows the Chinese government to control what content
is available within national borders.
However, another major branch of this censorship regime involves the coerced
self-regulation of Internet Content Providers (ICPs). China requires all ICPs to reg-
ister for a license in order to operate in the country, and ICPs are expected to sign a
“Public Pledge on Self-discipline for the Chinese Internet Industry” (the Pledge).41
This Pledge requires that they refrain “from producing, posting, or disseminating
pernicious information that may jeopardize state security and disrupt social stabil-
ity.” The result is that ICPs are themselves “direct participants in censoring Chinese
citizens,” and moreover they often engage in “overcensoring” since the govern-
ment’s guidelines do not make clear what constitutes acceptable content.42 This
complex layering of corporate self-censorship with the Great Firewall makes China
“a world leader in Internet censorship.”43
Various multinational corporations have attempted to do business in China as
ICPs, and have complied in the scheme described above. Yahoo! was the first to do
so when it set up the Yahoo! China search engine in 1999, with Microsoft and
Google following suit in 2005 and 2006 respectively. By complying with China’s
censorship regime, these multinational corporations ensured that they would not be
blocked by the Great Firewall.44 However, the degrees of their compliance have
varied notably. Microsoft, for example, shut down a Chinese political blog in 2005
“despite the fact that it was ‘hosted on servers located’ in the United States which
meant that Microsoft was not legally or morally bound to adhere to the request of
the Chinese government.”45 Yahoo! complied even further when it “provided elec-
tronic details and information about cyber-dissidents to the Chinese authorities,”
41 Human Rights Watch, “’Race to the Bottom’ Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet
Censorship,” (2006) 18:8 Human Rights Watch at 12, online:
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/08/09/race-bottom> [HRW].
42 Jessica Bauml, “It’s a Mad, Mad Internet: Globalization and the Challenges Presented
by Internet Censorship,” (2010-11) 63 Fed Comm LJ 697 at 705-706 [Bauml]; MacK-
innon, supra note 2 at 807, where she gives examples of vague directives such as “On
topics related to Google, carefully manage the information in exchanges, comments
and other interactive sessions.”
43 “China: World Leader of Internet Censorship”, Human Rights Watch (3 June 2011)
online: HRW <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/03/china-world-leader-internet-
censorship>.
44 MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 779.
45 Deva, supra note 5 at 270.
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resulting in numerous arrests and incarcerations.46 It should also be noted that, to
date, Yahoo! is the only western company known to have signed the Pledge.47
Google, conversely, confronted the Chinese government over the issue of cen-
sorship.48 Following a cyber-attack in December 2009,49 in March of 2010 Google
began rerouting Chinese visitors to an uncensored version of the site. The Chinese
government made no significant response to this act until June, when it threatened
to revoke Google’s license if the company continued to redirect users. Although
Google’s license was eventually renewed, since July 2010 the service has only of-
fered extremely limited results to Chinese users in order to avoid having to censor
search results.50
Each of these multinational corporations chose to comply with China’s online
censorship regime because of “the commercial opportunity offered by the Chinese
market.”51 Regardless of the varying degrees of complicity or the fact that Google
for one has since challenged China’s authority, each of these corporations saw en-
gagement in censorship as being within their business interests for years. Their re-
sultant actions as ICPs in China — as well as those of local corporate entities such
as Baidu52 — are not only inconsistent with FOE as it is defined in the IBHR but
also fall outside the permissible limitations established in the ICCPR. ICPs operat-
ing in China admit that they “over-block content which does not clearly violate any
specific law or regulation”53 in order to appease government authorities and
thereby not jeopardize their licenses. However, since these are private corporations
engaging in censorship as a business practice, their conduct falls outside the reach
of international human rights law. It is this problem of corporate unaccountability
that this article seeks to address.
46 Bauml, supra note 42 at 709; Deva, supra note 5 at 267; see also sections 4(b)(i) and
4(b)(ii) of this article for further discussion of the legal ramifications of this type of
conduct by Yahoo!.
47 HRW, supra note 41 at 12.
48 Austin Ramzy, “Google Ends Policy of Self-Censorship in China”, TIME (13 January
2010) online: Time
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1953248,00.html>.
49 Google blamed the Chinese government for the attack, and claimed that “a primary
goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activ-
ists”: David Drummond, “A new approach to China,” Google Official Blog (12 January
20120) online: Google <http://googleblog.blogspot.ca/2010/01/new-approach-to-
china.html>; ironically, cables released by WikiLeaks later proved that China was in-
deed behind the attack: Scott Shane & Andrew Lehren, “Leaked Cables Offer Raw
Look at US Diplomacy”, The New York Times (28 November 2010) online: New York
Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html?_r=2>.
50 Bauml, supra note 42 at 728; Juan Perez, “Restored Google China search Site very
limited in features”, Computer World (9 July 2010) online: Computer World
<http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9179060/Restored_Google_China_search_
site_very_limited_in_features>.
51 Deva, supra note 5 at 261.
52 See Bauml, supra note 42 at 726.
53 HRW, supra note 41 at 14.
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(c) The Role of Government?
It should be noted that while these examples show corporations acting to cen-
sor their online users, there is also a common thread of governmental involvement
in each scenario. With regards to China, the government’s role in the aforemen-
tioned acts of corporate censorship is explicit.54 Contrastingly, the US govern-
ment’s role in the attempted censorship of WikiLeaks is indirect to the point of
deniability, although the evidence does show that high level officials made no se-
cret of their dissatisfaction with the leaks; in particular the acknowledged impact55
of Senator Liberman’s actions56 demonstrates the relationship between government
aims and corporate censorship online.
Much has been made of this correlation in critical writings on the Internet,
FOE, general human rights, and international law alike. Many scholars have fo-
cused their efforts on critiquing the role of governments in these types of human
rights suppressions. However, while the American and Chinese governments un-
doubtedly played a role in these examples of censorship, the ultimate responsibility
is that of the corporate entities involved. In both China and the US, the corporate
actors involved decided that it was in the best interests of their business to engage
in censorship, as encouraged — though not explicitly required — by local govern-
ment. As MacKinnon has argued, the situation in “China is kind of exhibit A of
what happens when you get unaccountable companies combined with unaccounta-
ble governments in the Internet age” (emphasis added).57 By comparison,
WikiLeaks is what Birnhack, Koren, and Benkler argue happens when accountable
governments take advantage of the unaccountability of corporations.
Although there is undeniably a significant degree to which the questionable
actions and agendas of governments were involved in the examples listed above,
the focus of this article will be on the unaccountability of the corporations in-
volved. It is these entities that have traditionally been regulated by states but are
now challenging this paradigm as a result of legally problematic contemporary real-
ities like globalization and the Internet. The necessary result of this challenge is a
revaluation of how to achieve the aims of international human rights law in the
evolving new context of the Internet.
54 Albeit technically indirect by virtue of how the Chinese Internet Provider licensing
system engenders censorship by private entities.
55 Daly, supra note 18 at 5.
56 Ewen MacAskill, “WikiLeaks Website Pulled by Amazon after US Political Pressure”,
The Guardian (1 December 2010) online: The Guardian
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-website-cables-servers-
amazon/print>.
57 Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, “Rebecca MacKinnon
on The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom”, Berkman Center for Internet and
Society: Audio Fishbowl (3 February 2012) at 00:21:01 [Berkman]; Birnhack, supra
note 30 at 3: “Whether the Big Brother we distrust is government and its agencies, or
multinational corporations, the emerging collaboration between the two in the online
environment produces the ultimate threat.” This article will focus on the role played by
multinational corporations.
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IV. “MAGNA CARTA” MOMENTS?58
This section will canvas a variety of proposed and explored methods by which
to curtail undue corporate constraint of FOE on the Internet. First, there will be a
discussion of a proposed addition to international human rights law called The UN
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (the Norms). This will be followed by an
examination of two US legislative initiatives that have sought to enforce interna-
tional norms at the domestic level: the proposed Global Online Freedom Act and
the Alien Torts Statute (ATS). Finally, the focus will turn to a pair of political initia-
tives advocating voluntary corporate social responsibility models: the UN Global
Compact (the Compact) and the Global Network Initiative (GNI).
(a) International Legal Mechanisms
(i) The UN Norms
Advocates of applying international human rights laws to private entities often
point to the extreme powers held by transnational corporations. Amy Sinden, for
example, has argued that “if TNCs are really as powerful — or more powerful —
than many states, does it make sense to put them on the private side of the [public-
private] divide? . . . would it not make more sense . . . to treat them as duty-holders
vis-a-vis the human rights claims of individuals just as states are?”59 While this
account of the power dynamic between state actors and private corporations is
somewhat debatable, in the context of the Internet it is undeniable that corporate
owners hold unprecedented control over online spaces used by the global public.
With this in mind, the application of international laws such as human rights to
private corporations seems like a natural answer. However, proposed realizations of
this possible solution have proved to be divisive within the international
community.
Discussion about expanding international human rights law to apply directly
to corporate actors has tended to be split between two possible methods of imple-
mentation: the creation of an international tribunal, comparable to the International
Criminal Court, or else a system that relies on regulation by state actors in a way
that is consistent with international standards. The former method has been advo-
58 Berkman, supra note 57 at 00:29:30; MacKinnon describes how the signing of the
Magna Carta “was the first manifestation that there might be some other way of
organizing power and governance,” and further urges for a contemporary “Magna
Carta moment” when the governing power over the Internet is dramatically
reformulated in favour of netizens as opposed to the corporate and governmental
powers-that-be.
59 Amy Sinden, “Power and Responsibility: Why Human Rights Should Address Corpo-
rate Environmental Wrongs” in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Camp-
bell, eds, The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the
Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 520–523 [Sinden].
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cated by human rights scholars and political activists but has not garnered much
support from the international community.60
However, the second proposed method, which calls on participating states to
enforce international values, has gained momentum at the UN a number of times.
In the mid-1970s a code of conduct for corporations acting outside their home
country was proposed, and the UN Centre for Transnational Corporations was es-
tablished to produce a draft. Although this was completed in 1983, the end of the
Cold War prompted foreign investment and a move towards deregulation, and the
Code was ultimately abandoned in 1990.61 In 1998, however, the UN Sub-Com-
mission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights established a sessional
working group on multinational corporations and in 2003 this group submitted a
draft document known as “The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” (the
Norms)62 to the UN Human Rights Commission (the Commission).63
The Norms outlined a global standard for corporate behaviour to be imposed
via binding legal obligations on both state and private actors. Drawing from ex-
isting international human rights documents such as the IBHR, the Norms specifi-
cally identified which rights were most likely to be impacted by corporate conduct
and proposed corresponding obligations on corporate entities to ensure that these
vulnerable rights be respected and protected. These duties included the requirement
for transnational corporations to “adopt, disseminate and implement internal opera-
tional rules in compliance with the Norms and also to incorporate the Norms in
contracts with other parties.64 A number of frameworks for monitoring implemen-
tation of the Norms were also suggested, but state actors were given primary re-
sponsibility to supervise corporate entities based within their borders. Any breach
of the Norms was to be remedied via the contravening business’ payment of repara-
tions to affected parties.
60 Ibid., at 523–526; David Kinley, Justine Nolan & Natalie Zerial, “‘The Norms are
Dead! Long Live the Norms!’ The Politics Behind the UN Human Rights Norms for
Corporations,” in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, eds, The
New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law, (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 467-468 [Kinley Nolan Zerial]; see also
“Developments — International Criminal Law,” (2001) 114 Harvard Law Review
1943 at 2031-2032.
61 David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, “The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations:
The Private Implications of Public International Law,” (2006) 2 Human Rights Law
Review, online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=44153> [Kinley Chambers]; see also Steven
Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility” (2001)
111 Yale Law Journal 443 at 457.
62 United Nations Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights Sub-
Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, “Norms on the respon-
sibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to
human rights” (26 August 2003) online: UNHCHR <http://www.unhchr.ch/
huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En>.
63 Kinley Chambers, supra note 61; Kinley Nolan Zerial, supra note 60.
64 Kinley Chambers, supra note 61 at 7.
156   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [11 C.J.L.T.]
When the Commission first considered the Norms in 2004, it did so under the
shadow of polarized opinion. Various business groups vehemently opposed the idea
of binding international human rights standards for corporate entities, while aca-
demics, non-governmental organizations, and activists supported the expansion of
human rights laws to private actors. Eventually it was decided that the Office of the
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (the OHCHR) would hold further con-
sultations with relevant stakeholders and make a full report on the Norms, which
would then be reconsidered by the Commission. Subsequent debate in 2005
prompted official recognition of the fact that transnational corporations can contrib-
ute to the enjoyment of human rights, and the appointment of Professor John Rug-
gie as the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General on the issue of
human rights and business (SRSG). In 2006 the SRSG filed an Interim Report in
which he acknowledged the Norms’ positive contributions to the debate about the
impact of transnational corporate conduct on human rights, but critiqued such im-
precise expansion of international laws.65 The SRSG concluded that “the divisive
debate over the Norms obscures rather than illuminates promising areas of consen-
sus and cooperation among business, civil society, governments and international
institutions with respect to human rights,”66 and consequently the Norms were
abandoned.
The point of the Norms was not for the document that was submitted to the
Commission to be written into international law, but rather to initiate a process that
would culminate in some form of change to the scope of international human rights
law. Although the proposed framework had problematic elements,67 it was merely
a draft intended to begin debate amongst the UN members and be subsequently
amended accordingly to group consensus.68 Instead the document became symbolic
of the sheer possibility for international human rights law to evolve so as to become
applicable to private entities. The UN’s abandonment of this path demonstrates that
the use of traditional public law mechanisms to control private conduct does not
appeal to the various stakeholders involved — or at least most substantially repre-
sented — in the debate over the Norms.69
However, this setback has not concluded the debate about the accountability
of private international entities. The Norms were meant to begin a dialogue over
the unaccountability of corporate entities and potential solutions, and in that sense
they achieved their purpose. Unabated by the failure of the Norms, the movement
65 Ibid. at 14.
66 Commission on Human Rights, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, UNESCOR, 62nd Sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/97 (22 Feb-
ruary 2006) at para. 69.
67 Deva, supra note 5 at 298.
68 Kinley Nolan Zerial, supra note 60 at 464-465.
69 Ibid. at 459: “The debate surrounding the Norms epitomizes the increasing pervasive-
ness of the influence of non-state actors at the international level.”
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for improving corporate conduct standards continues via both new and familiar
methods.70
(b) State-based Initiatives
Another possible method by which to protect free expression online is to enact
domestic legislation that ensures the protection of international human rights law,
or at least freedom of expression. Although the examples described in section 3 of
this article show the State playing a role in various forms of corporate censorship,
this unfortunate reality does not mean that domestic government is incapable of
acting in the service of freedom of expression. As Smith notes, “freedom of expres-
sion operates at both horizontal and vertical levels. The right is designed to protect
the individual against arbitrary interference . . . by both the State and other private
individuals. States are obligated to ensure that national law protects the freedom of
expressions at both levels, providing appropriate safeguards and remedies in the
event of infringement” (emphasis added).71 Indeed, numerous recent US legal ini-
70 The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) is an unprecedented new avenue for change at
the international level that arose at the same time as the Norms’ demise. Convened by
the UN Secretary-General, the IGF seeks to draw multi-stakeholders together (includ-
ing governments, private corporations, and activist groups) to engage in non-binding
discussions. The goal is to bring about change indirectly by facilitating better-informed
policy decisions by all members in support of a more equal and open Internet. Al-
though this is a novel approach with laudable objectives, in practice the IGF has proven
less inspiring. It is by definition difficult to point to tangible positive achievements
resulting from the IGF, and indeed its formulation has been critiqued as making it “dif-
ficult to imagine [the IGF] having anything more than ‘soft governance power.’” Addi-
tionally, the initiative has failed to attract or hold the interests of governments and
corporations from North America, one of the most important jurisdictions in terms of
being home to many powerful corporate Internet companies like those discussed in this
article. Most distressingly, however, recent events have indicated that some currently
involved government actors are disinterested in participating on equal footing with
non-governmental stakeholders. At an IGF meeting in September 2011, China, Russia,
and other nations asserted that “policy authority for Internet-related public issues is the
sovereign right of states.” Google’s Vint Cerf has critiqued this attitude as “interfering
with what would otherwise be thought to be freedom of expression.” As of this writing
the impacts of the IGF are difficult if not impossible to discern, while its participants
have openly engaged in political struggles that detract from the initiative’s goals. It is
at best uncertain whether the IGF can achieve what it set out to do, and moreover it
appears that the IGF has not been able to positively impact FOE online thus far. For
more information on the IGF please see: John Mathiason, Internet Governance: The
New Frontier of Global Institutions (New York: Routledge, 2009); Chengetai
Masango, “The Internet Governance Forum: Its Development, Function and Future” in
Wolfgang Benedek, ed, Internet Governance and the Information Society, (Portland,
OR: Eleven International Publishing, 2008); Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Multi-Stake-
holder Internet Governance: the Role of Governments” in Wolfgang Benedek, ed, In-
ternet Governance and the Information Society, (Portland, OR: Eleven International
Publishing, 2008); MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 3266–3298; Benedek, supra note 7.
71 Smith, supra note 8 at 292; Jeffrey Bone, “Legal Perspectives on Corporate Responsi-
bility: Contractarian or Communitarian Thought?” (2011) 24 Can JL & Jur 277–304 at
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tiatives have shown that domestic legislative action is nevertheless a viable mecha-
nism for responding to these types of human rights violations.
The focus in this section will be on a number of US legislative initiatives,
namely the Global Online Freedom Act (GOFA) and the Alien Torts Statute (ATS).
There are a variety of reasons behind this analytical focus, the most basic of which
is that this type of legislative initiative is relatively unique to the US. GOFA and
ATS are novel and dubious initiatives that have each raised significant concerns
about extraterritoriality. This quality may prove to be the death knell for these laws,
and it leaves them largely without comparison internationally. Additionally, it has
already been noted that FOE is an internationally recognized human right that nev-
ertheless varies in scope from state to state. However, the US enjoys some of the
most extensive FOE worldwide, and as such it is not entirely surprising that there
are unique legislative initiatives from that country seeking to promote FOE interna-
tionally. Another factor driving the focus on US legislation is the fact that so many
of the most powerful and influential companies in the online sphere originate or at
least operate within the US. Finally, at the most basic level and as a result of the
reasons listed above, the literature in this area is predominantly focused on these
two initiatives.72,,73
(i) The Global Online Freedom Act
The Global Online Freedom Act (GOFA) is a legislative initiative aimed spe-
cifically at promoting FOE online via regulation of the global conduct of American
Internet companies. The bill’s origins are rooted in the conduct of US multinational
corporations operating in China. Senator Christopher Smith has specifically cited
47: “there is a role for public regulation of corporations to ensure that the public trust is
not abused by corporate power” [Bone].
72 It should also be noted that it is outside the scope of this article to evaluate individual
legislative initiatives to regulate corporate activity at the domestic level. This includes
acts like the Canada Business Corporations Act, which sets the law governing the op-
erations of corporations operating within Canada. These types of legal mechanisms are
inherently limited by jurisdictional restrictions, and hence can only apply to private
entities based or operating within national borders. The foreign conduct of multina-
tional corporations can often frustrate domestic legal regimes and place impugned ac-
tivities in a sort of “legal vacuum.” This is doubly true in the context of the Internet,
the alleged “borderlessness” of which can make domestic enforcement unviable if not
impossible. More fundamentally, however, purely domestic regulation schemes are
shaped by local concerns and values and as such often feature unique permutations of
international laws and norms. This is especially true in the case of FOE since that
right’s scope varies so wildly internationally. The purpose of this article is to evaluate
different methods that have been proposed to regulate corporate activity — specifically
that in the online context — in accordance with the aims of international human rights
laws — and specifically those relating to FOE. As such, the legislative initiatives dis-
cussed below will be restricted to those seeking to apply international human rights
laws and norms to private entities at a domestic level.
73 For more information on the legal “borderlessness” of the Internet, see Andrea Slane,
“Tales, Techs, and Territories: Private International Law, Globalization, and the Legal
Construction of Borderlessness on the Internet” (2008) 71 Law & Contemp Probs 129.
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Yahoo!’s identification of dissident bloggers to the Chinese government as the type
of occurrence motivating the bill.74 The bill proposes to respond to the failure of
companies like Yahoo! “to develop standards by which they can conduct business
with authoritarian foreign governments while protecting human rights to freedom
of speech and freedom of expression.”75 First introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives in 2006, GOFA has seen numerous revisions; the latest version of the bill
was introduced on December 8, 2011,76 and was approved by the Africa, Global
Health and Human Rights Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on March 27, 2012.77 The bill will now proceed to the entire House of Representa-
tives for further review.
The latest version of the bill proposes to institute an extensive regime by
which to monitor and promote FOE online worldwide.78 Specifically, the bill ex-
pands existing “annual country reports on human rights practices” to include as-
sessments of freedom of electronic information.79 Based on these expanded reports,
the US State Department would be required to produce an annual list of “Internet-
restricting countries.”80 Any public “Internet communications service company”
operating within such Internet-restricting countries would then be required to sub-
mit annual reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These re-
74 Bauml, supra note 42 at 712; Deva, supra note 5 at 289; Thomas DeNae, “Xiaoning v.
Yahoo! Inc.’s Invocation of the Alien Tort Statute: An Important Issue but an Improper
Vehicle” (2008) 11 Vanderbilt Journal Of Environment and Tech Law 211 at 216
[Thomas]; Sarah Stirland, “House Subcommittee Approves Global Online Freedom
Act” Tech President (27 March 2012) online: Tech President
<http://techpresident.com/news/21976/house-subcommittee-approves-global-online-
freedom-act> [Stirland]. See the section below on the Alien Torts Statute for further
discussion of the legal ramifications of Yahoo!’s conduct.
75 The latest version of GOFA is identified as HR 3605, and its progress can be tracked at
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3605>.
76 Christopher Smith, “Amendment In the Nature of a Substitute to HR 3605” (8 Decem-
ber 2011) online: <http://chrissmith.house.gov/UploadedFiles/HR_3605_ANS.pdf>
[GOFA].
77 Juliana Gruenwald, “Panel Back Bill Targetting Internet Censorship Abroad”, National
Journal (27 March 2012) online: Tech Daily Dose
<http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2012/03/panel-backs-bill-targeting-int.php>;
Stirland, supra note 74.
78 The latest version of GOFA (supra note 76) also includes provisions prohibiting the
exportation of technologies that primarily facilitate surveillance or censorship to In-
ternet-restricting countries. These provisions could undoubtedly have an impact on
global FOE online, such as by preventing the establishment of institutions similar to the
aforementioned Great Firewall of China. These provisions only indirectly impact mul-
tinational corporations and FOE online, and as such are beyond the scope of this article
and will not be explored. However, it should be noted that many critiques of the latest
version of GOFA have to do with the fact that its anti-trade provisions may indirectly
prevent dissidents in Internet-restricting countries from accessing the technologies nec-
essary to resist their governments.
79 Deva, supra note 5 at 312.
80 GOFA, supra note 76 s. 104(1).
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ports must document each company’s internal policies and actions pertaining to
human rights,81 requests from Internet-restricting governments for information dis-
closure, and transparency where such governments have required them to engage in
censorship. These reports would then be made available to the public so as to facili-
tate greater awareness of each company’s policies and actions pertaining to world-
wide FOE online. Failure to submit a report could result in a company’s securities
registration being revoked.
However, an interesting new aspect of the latest revision of GOFA is its “Safe
Harbor” provisions that encourage participation in multi-stakeholder initiatives.
Any business entities covered by the act that are certified by such initiatives are not
required to submit annual reports containing the information detailed above. These
companies are thus given the option of either complying with the US State Depart-
ment or else with a multi-stakeholder initiative. This new aspect to GOFA has po-
tentially far reaching and beneficial consequences that will be explored in greater
detail below.82
GOFA has been revised numerous times since its initial introduction in 2006,
and the latest version includes substantial changes to how the bill proposes to
achieve its aims. As a result of these changes, much of the literature pertaining to
the bill has become outdated. However, some previous appraisals are still pertinent.
GOFA would allow the US “to enforce internationally recognized human rights
obligations on the overseas activity of national corporations and their subsidiar-
ies.”83 More specifically the bill would create an anti-censorship regime in the fur-
therance of FOE online with economic enforcement mechanisms — albeit indirect
ones.84 This would give corporate entities — though only ones substantively based
in America — a tangible and lawful motivation to be transparent and avoid actions
that would stifle FOE.
Despite this, there are criticisms that have been levelled against previous in-
carnations of GOFA that remain applicable. Some scholars have noted inherent
problems with seeking to regulate corporate conduct via legislative means, arguing
that “legislation appears much too late in corporate innovation and business cycles.
Legislation does nothing to help companies anticipate problems that their business
or design choices might create — before they implement them.”85 However, the
81 Ibid., s. 201(a). The bill would require businesses to institute (and give evidence of)
policies that are consistent with the human rights related provisions of the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The most recent version of those guidelines
indicates that multinational enterprises should respect and avoid abuse of human rights,
and specifically encourages the support of Internet freedom and FOE. The OECD
Guidelines are available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf>.
82 The bill specifically identifies the Global Network Initiative (GNI) as an example of
the type of multi-stakeholder initiative that would be permissible under GOFA. See the
section below on the GNI for an evaluation of it, and multi-stakeholder initiatives more
broadly, as a potential method by which to curtail corporate FOE violations. These
types of initiatives will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this article.
83 Deva, supra note 5 at 311.
84 GOFA, supra note 76 s. 201, which amends section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 USC 78m).
85 MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 2749.
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latest version of GOFA does not seek to sanction businesses for previous miscon-
duct as much as it does to encourage future good conduct via enforceable stan-
dards. As such it gives corporate entities the responsibility to heed human rights
norms in all of their commercial enterprises, but does not punish businesses for the
unforeseeable consequences of their actions. Additionally, the variety offered by
the choice between the State Department’s standards and those available under the
Safe Harbor provisions effectively curtails the earlier critique that it is “impossible
to adopt an effective one-size-fits-all legislative approach without becoming so
broad as to be meaningless — or so restrictive as to make it impossible for US
technology companies to do business in many countries.”86
Most fundamentally, earlier versions of the bill were criticised for exporting
US law by imposing civil and criminal sanctions on corporate entities for activities
that occurred outside US borders. The current form of the bill would not impose
sanctions for international conduct but would instead set domestic requirements
and expectations, and failure to meet them could result in domestic economic pen-
alties. Although the goal is substantively the same, the new formulation of the bill’s
enforcement mechanism avoids the extraterritorial quality that was so vehemently
opposed in previous drafts. Moreover, this change could mean that GOFA might
actually stand a chance of being passed into law. Previously GOFA had been
largely discounted by legal scholars specifically because the bill laid down domes-
tic civil and criminal penalties for extraterritorial activity. Due to the fact that the
US has historically followed a presumption against extraterritoriality87 (as com-
pared to China, Australia, etc.) most academics assumed that GOFA would never
become law. However the latest version’s retooling of the enforcement mechanism
may avoid this concern altogether.
It remains to be seen whether or not the current — or even a future form of —
GOFA will ultimately become US law. Although the substantive elimination of the
extraterritoriality problems associated with earlier drafts has inspired hope for the
latest bill,88 it is nevertheless still a complex law that many are uncomfortable with.
Regardless, GOFA’s continuing evolution is itself a positive sign that lawmakers
are treating online censorship seriously. The latest version of the bill is by all ac-
counts the best attempt yet to impose legally binding standards on corporations to
respect FOE online.
(ii) The Alien Torts Statute
The Alien Torts Statute (ATS) is a curious example of the lengths to which
advocates of corporate liability for human rights violations have gone in support of
their cause. Enacted as a part of the US Judiciary Act of 1789, ATS gives US dis-
trict courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
86 Ibid.
87 Bauml, supra note 42 at 713; see also the decision in Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, Ltd., which says that “When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterrito-
rial application, it has none” at 2878.
88 Andrew Feinberg, “House committee okays latest version of GOFA”, The Hill (27
March 2012), online: <http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/218571-
house-committee-okays-latest-version-of-gofa>.
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committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”89 The
origins behind the statute are unclear, although scholars have suggested that it was
designed as a means of both fighting piracy and also allowing foreign diplomats to
bring forward actions in tort against domestic assailants.90 Whatever the reasons
for its enactment, the statute sat mostly dormant for almost 200 years before being
revived in 1980 by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filártiga v.
Peña-Irala.91 In a landmark decision the Court stated that ATS provides federal
jurisdiction “whenever an alleged [violator of universally accepted norms of the
international law of human rights] is found and served with process within [US]
borders.”92 The decision opened up an entire new avenue to pursue legal action for
contraventions of international law, and it was not long before complaints against
corporate entities for violations of human rights began to come forward under
ATS.93
The act allows US district courts to “enforce internationally recognized human
rights obligations on the overseas activities of national corporations and their sub-
sidiaries.”94 Indeed, it has seen use in the aforementioned context of the dissident
bloggers that Yahoo! identified to the Chinese government. Yahoo! settled an ATS
lawsuit brought forward by Human Rights USA over the company’s role in the
arrest and imprisonment of Chinese journalists.95
In theory, then, ATS provides a mechanism by which to set corporate human
rights obligations such as FOE via enforceable economic penalties.96 However, in
practice the power of the act is significantly less far-reaching. The statute is limited
to those entities that can be and are served within the United States, and although
89 28 U.S.C. s. 1350 [ATS].
90 Douglas Branson, “Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable? Achilles’ Heels
in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation” (2011) 9 Santa Clara Journal of International Law
251 at 230 [Branson]; Colin Kearney, “Corporate Liability Claims Not Actionable
Under the Alien Tort Statute — Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111
(2d Cir., 2010)” (2011) 34 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 263, at 264 [Kearney].
91 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir., 1980) [Filártiga]; the case involved a civil suit by a Paraguayan
national for the wrongful death by torture of her brother at the hands of a police official
from Asunción, Paraguay, who was living illegally in the United States.
92 Branson, supra note 90 at 227; Filártiga, supra note 91.
93 Ibid. at 228; Bauml, supra note 42 at 710-11; Donald Kochan, “Legal Mechanization
of Corporate Social Responsibility Through Alien Tort Statute Litigation — A Re-
sponse to Professor Branson with some Supplemental Thoughts” (2011) 9 Santa Clara
Journal of International Law 251 at 253 [Kochan].
94 Deva, supra note 5 at 311.
95 Bauml, supra note 42 at 712; Thomas, supra note 74 at 213; see also World Organiza-
tion for Human Rights USA, “Who We’ve Helped: Families of Shi Tao and Wang
Xiaoning”, online: <http://www.humanrightsusa.org/index.php?option-
comcontent&task=view&id=15&Itemid=35>.
96 Kochan, supra note 93 at 257: “The ATS is arguably the most important tool under the
coercion-induced/involuntary category. It provides a means for reaching states, individ-
uals, and corporations, and holding them to legally enforceable standards. Thus, how
the ATS develops is pivotal to the most powerful mechanization opportunity for corpo-
rate social responsibility ideals.”
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this requirement has at times been fully embraced to its literal meaning97 it never-
theless limits ATS’s applicability. The act also only allows for claims to be brought
forward by non-US entities, thus limiting the range of potential claimants and creat-
ing potential difficulties for violations committed within the United States.
Most seriously, however, ATS is limited in its ability to only apply customary
international law. Following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,98 “for a violation of a norm of international law to be
actionable under ATS, universal consensus of States on the point and an elevated
specificity are required.”99 In other words, ATS can only be used to enforce cus-
tomary international law — definable, obligatory, and universally accepted interna-
tional norms.100 The problem with this narrowing of scope is two-fold. In terms of
FOE specifically, following the decision in Sosa the ATS is no longer a viable
mechanism for seeking redress for censorship. Freedom of Expression is a complex
and problematic human right in that it exists in varying degrees throughout the
world. Free expression standards diverge dramatically from country to country,
with even the United States and Canada enjoying vastly different levels of speech
protection. These kinds of differences are even more striking when North American
standards are compared to those of some European countries101 and China. As a
result of this disparity no one definition of FOE is sufficiently accepted enough to
meet the Sosa requirement for claims actionable under ATS.102
However, even if one definition of FOE were to become universally accepted
enough to meet the Sosa requirement, it is not certain that claims against corporate
entities are themselves actionable under ATS. In the decades since the revival of the
statute in Filártiga many claims against corporations have been launched but few
have been reviewed by the higher level US courts as most have been settled.103
However, a recent corporate human rights violations case called Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum104 advanced to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit where
it was decided that “corporate liability is not a norm that [can be] recognize[d] and
appl[ied] in actions under the ATS because the customary international law of
97 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir., 1995), in which the defendant was
served with summons and complaint during a transfer at New York’s Kennedy Airport;
Branson, supra note 90 at 227.
98 542 U.S. 692 (2004) [Sosa].
99 Koebele, supra note 13 at 50; see also Sosa, supra note 98 at 2765: “federal courts
should not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any
international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized na-
tions than the historical paradigms familiar when [ATS] was enacted.”
100 Koebele, supra note 13 at 50-51.
101 See for example Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contra Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1181, 1184-1185 (N.D. Cal., 2001).
102 Koebele, supra note 13 at 116–121.
103 Kearney, supra note 90 at 266; Susan Simpson, “Alien Tort Statute Cases Resulting in
Plaintiff Victories,” The View from LL2 (28 December 2010), online:
<http://viewfromll2.com/2009/11/11/alien-tort-statute-cases-resulting-in-plaintiff-
victories>.
104 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir., 2010), 120 [Kiobel].
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human rights does not impose any form of liability on corporations.”105 As Justice
Leval noted in his concurring judgment, “The majority opinion deals a substantial
blow to international law and its undertaking to protect fundamental human
rights.”106 Admittedly the decision in Kiobel has not definitively concluded the is-
sue of corporate liability under the ATS,107 and the US Supreme Court is currently
reviewing Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in that case. However, on
March 5, 2012, the Supreme Court announced that it would hear additional argu-
ments and called for the parties to the litigation to prepare new briefs on whether or
not the ATS allows US courts to act extraterritorially.108 The fact that the Supreme
Court has focused their analysis on this issue does not bode well for the claim-
105 Kiobel, supra note 104 at 45, emphasis in original. As the court noted at 13, “custom-
ary international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate liability for inter-
national crimes,” and although not directly cited the divisive debate and subsequent
abandonment of the UN Norms in 2006 certainly mirrors this observation. The court’s
decision in Kiobel thus reflects the aforementioned global resistance of government
and business stakeholders to the application of traditional public law mechanisms to
private entities at the international level. It should also be noted that many critics of
Kiobel have pointed out the irony that the decision allows corporations to escape liabil-
ity in the US for human rights violations despite the fact that these private entities
increasingly enjoy human rights protections under Citizens United v. Federal Elections
Commission, 558 U.S. 08-205 (2010); Mulchinski, supra note 4 at 437; Mike Sacks,
“Corporate Personhood Case Forces Supreme Court to Hack New Path”, The Huf-
fington Post (27 February 2012), online: <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/02/27/corporate-personhood-supreme-court-alien-tort-statute_n_1305226.html>.
106 Kiobel, supra note 104 at 49; Branson, supra note 88 at 234 labels the majority’s deci-
sion the “death knell” of ATS’s scope for imposing corporate liability for contraven-
tions of international human rights.
107 See also Flomo v. Firestone National Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011), 1021;
Xiomara Angulo, “International Law: New Civil Liability for Corporations: The Sev-
enth Circuit Takes a Stand on the Alien Tort Statute” (2011) 7 Seventh Circuit Review
28 at 28 [Angulo]; Marco Simons, “Kiobel’s First Victim: Flomo v. Firestone”, Earth
Rights International (5 October 2010), online: <http://www.earthrights.org/
blog/kiobels-first-victim-flomo-v-firestone>.
108 Supreme Court of the United States, “An order in pending case 10-1491 Kiobel, Esther,
et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, et al.” Supreme Court of the United States (5 March
2012), online: <http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/030512zr.pdf>; Lyle
Denniston, “Kiobel to be expanded and reargued”, SCOTUS Blog (5 March 2012), on-
line: <http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/kiobel-to-be-reargued>.
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ants109 given the US’s aforementioned hesitancy towards extraterritoriality.110 If
the Supreme Court upholds the earlier decision in Kiobel, or else rules against the
use of the ATS to pursue legal action for “violations of the law of nations occurring
within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States,”111 it will put an
end to one of the most valuable means for discouraging corporate entities from
engaging in activities that violate international human rights.112,,113
Given the uncertainty over whether any form of GOFA will ever become law
and the still-developing case law surrounding ATS, it is not clear whether domestic
legislative initiatives are a viable avenue for enforcing FOE on corporate entities in
the online sphere. The dramatic variances in how FOE is framed make it a particu-
109 “Could anything be worse for alien tort claimants than arguing before a hostile U.S.
Supreme Court on corporate liability, as the plaintiffs in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell
did last month? Yes: arguing before a hostile Supreme Court on extraterritoriality, as
those plaintiffs will have to do next term, thanks to a surprise procedural order on
March 5” in Michael D Goldhaber, “The Global Lawyer: Human Rights Plaintiffs
Can’t Even Pick Their Own Poison”, The AM Law Daily (19 March 2012), online:
<http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2012/03/the-global-lawyer-human-rights-
plaintiffs-cant-even-pick-their-poison.html>; likewise see comments by the defence
following the Supreme Court’s announcement: Sue Reisinger, “The Impact of Corpo-
rate Amicus Briefs on the Supreme Court in Kiobel”, Law.com (8 March 2012), online:
<http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202544756870>.
110 Bauml, supra note 42 at 713.
111 See the US Supreme Court’s order from 5 March 2012, supra note 108.
112 Branson, supra note 90 at 249.
113 It should also be noted that the evolution of ATS could also potentially impact a similar
legislative initiative in Canada. Bill C-323, also known as An Act to Amend the Federal
Courts Act (international promotion and protection of human rights). This proposed
legislative amendment seeks to give federal courts original jurisdiction over civil cases
brought forward by non-Canadian citizens for violations of international law that oc-
curred outside of Canada. The amendment is extremely similar to ATS albeit more spe-
cifically geared towards international human rights than the American statute. Due to
this close resemblance between the two pieces of legislation, it is highly likely that US
case law surrounding the use of ATS to curtail human rights violations would be influ-
ential on judicial interpretations of Bill C-323 if it ever passed into law. The US Su-
preme Court’s decision in Kiobel could therefore significantly impact Canadian courts’
abilities to target corporate entities under Bill C-323. Additionally, although the Act
does not set limits to the jurisdiction it establishes for federal courts, it does specifically
list a number of actions that would be captured under its purview. This non-exhaustive
list includes crimes like genocide, slavery, and torture, but notably does not specifically
identify FOE among the types of conduct actionable under Bill C-323. Based on how
Sosa limited the scope of ATS to customary international law, it is possible that Bill C-
323 would be similarly restricted such that FOE would not be protected. However, the
extraterritoriality issue at least might not be as much of a problem for litigation under
Bill C-323 since the amendment specifically gives federal courts jurisdiction over acts
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larly difficult right to enforce at an international level, but even more universally
accepted human rights have proven difficult to enforce via domestic legislation.
The problems with this approach are also not specific to the US, but rather have to
do with the inherent difficulties associated with extraterritorialism114 and the fact
that customary international law does not clearly recognize either FOE or corporate
liability for human rights violations. Without a substantial change in international
law115 these difficulties will remain significant hurdles for any domestic legislative
initiatives seeking to address the problems identified in this article.
With the significant uncertainty about whether international or domestic law
are capable of establishing a reliable mechanism for opposing corporate human
rights violations — either online or otherwise — the last avenue this article will ex-
plore for changing corporate activity is private action. Specifically, this means ini-
tiatives to encourage rather than compel good corporate conduct via political force,
such as movements behind voluntary codes of conduct for businesses.
(c) Multi-stakeholder Initiatives
Parallel to these international and domestic legal attempts to bring corporate
activity in line with global human rights standards, scholars and activists have
championed a multitude of corporate social responsibility models. Broadly speak-
ing, corporate social responsibility (CSR) theories assert that businesses have obli-
gations beyond profit. These theories call for companies to integrate concern for
social, environmental, and political realities into their behaviour. CSR “conceives
of a corporation as a community of constituencies with directors owing duties to all
stakeholders,”116 and proposes that companies reflect this in their operational
models.
Advocates of CSR have tried to encourage corporations to adopt more socially
responsible company policies. The international and domestic legislative initiatives
described in previous sections were products of such efforts, and demonstrate the
growing prevalence of CSR theories. However, these movements have not been
entirely successful for the reasons detailed above, many of which relate to the in-
flexibility of legal frameworks and governance. As such, many advocates have pur-
sued private initiatives to encourage CSR, such as voluntary codes of conduct or
non-governmental coalitions.
Efforts in this context lose both the symbolic and practical force of law by
which to establish and enforce standards. At the same time, however, private move-
ments are freer to pursue idealistic goals than the officials behind the aforemen-
tioned international and domestic legal efforts.117 Private endeavours are con-
114 Teresa Scassa & Robert Currie, “New First Principles? Assessing the Internet’s Chal-
lenges to Jurisdiction” (2011) 42 Geo J Int’l L 1017.
115 Such as a clear international initiative to hold corporate entities accountable for viola-
tions of human rights, much like that proposed by the UN Norms.
116 Bone, supra note 71 at 43.
117 It is this freedom that allows them to be innovative; Mulchinski, supra note 4 argues at
457: “to dismiss voluntary sources of international or national CSR standards as irrele-
vant seems to fail to appreciate how formal rules and principles of law emerge. The
very fact that an increasing number of non-binding codes are being drafted and adopted
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strained only by the necessity to be widely accepted in order to even hope to effect
change, although this popularity requirement points to a broad difficulty for private
initiatives: they must compete with one another. Just as with any political subject,
opinions vary on what constitutes good corporate conduct and as such there are
innumerable movements advocating for largely the same goal: greater respect for
human rights by corporate entities. Each of these initiatives competes with one an-
other — as well as opposition — to achieve popular support in order to instil
change.
This article will focus on two such initiatives: the UN Global Compact (the
Compact) and the Global Network Initiative (the GNI). The reason for this focus is
that these two initiatives demonstrate how both governmental and private forces are
pursuing efforts of this kind. Additionally, it will be made clear below that many of
the strengths and weaknesses associated with these two initiatives are common-
place if not inherent to this general type of political act; as such a lengthy catalogu-
ing of all similar movements worldwide and their individual variances would not
be particularly helpful. Finally, the fact that the UN and some of the most powerful
corporate entities in the online sphere support the Compact and the GNI sets them
apart from other similar efforts, and makes these particular initiatives the most rele-
vant to corporate violations of human rights online.
(i) The United Nations Global Compact118
The Compact is a policy initiative for businesses to voluntarily adopt and im-
plement in order to demonstrate their commitment to social responsibility.
Launched in 2000, the Compact brings together private entities in order to set con-
duct standards that maintain international human rights law norms.119 These stan-
dards have been — and continue to be — designed after much discussion between
the Compact’s UN directors and various stakeholders including corporations, gov-
ernments, and other UN agencies. The Compact seeks to achieve its two overall
objectives120 via a combination of “leadership, dialogues, learning, and network-
ing.”121 With “over 8700 corporate participants” from around the world, the Com-
in this area suggests a growing interest among important groups and organizations . . .
and is leading to the establishment of a rich set of sources from which new binding
standards can emerge.”
118 For more information see: <http://www.unglobalcompact.org>.
119 As the SRSG John Ruggie has stated, the Compact “is intended to identify, disseminate
and promote good practices based on universal principles.” John Gerard Ruggie, Sym-
posium: Trade, Sustainability and Global Governance, 27 Colum J Envtl L 297 at 301
(2002).
120 These goals are to “Mainstream the ten principles in business activities around the
world” and to “Catalyze actions in support of broader UN goals, including the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs).” See online:
<http://unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html>.
121 Deva, supra note 5 at 293.
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pact has a strong global representation and is “the largest voluntary corporate re-
sponsibility initiative in the world.”122
The Compact presents a framework for good corporate conduct via a list of ten
guiding principles. These principles are explicitly drawn from international law in-
struments such as the UDHR,123 and cover human rights, labour standards, and
environmental and anti-corruption concerns. Specifically, the first and second prin-
ciples address human rights and identify FOE as a freedom that should be sup-
ported and respected by businesses.124 Each participant in the Compact is asked to
embrace and promote these principles in all of their undertakings worldwide. More-
over, the Compact tasks each participant with providing an annual report known as
a Communication on Progress (COP) on how it has implemented the ten principles.
The Compact has attracted significant criticism from scholars and activists for
the ways it seeks to change corporate activity.125 For example, the Compact does
not regulate or even benchmark its participants. All that is required for participation
is the annual submission of a COP, and failures to comply with the ten principles
are met with few, if arguably any, practical consequences. For example, as of
March 2012 the Compact has expelled 3,290 former participants for failing to sub-
mit a COP for over two years.126 This represents the strongest form of reproach
possible for companies that fail to live up to the Compact’s values.127 Moreover,
the significant number of companies that have failed to meet the Compact’s (not
particularly onerous) standards has led some to see participation as a mere public
relations stunt for businesses.128 Despite its admittedly strong international support,
if participants do not meet the Compact’s standards then it has not achieved its
purpose.
Additionally, the ten principles have been critiqued for being so vague as to be
meaningless, with the second principle tasking Compact participants with making
“sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.”129 This lack of specific-
ity has been criticized as being “counter-productive” to the achievement of the
122 See online: <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/
index.html>.
123 See online: <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/
index.html>.
124 See online: <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/
humanRights.html>.
125 For example, the Global Compact Critics blog is entirely dedicated to collecting and
sharing “opinions, news items and background information” from “organizations and
people with concerns about the UN Global Compact.” See online:
<http://globalcompactcritics.blogspot.ca>.
126 See online: <http://unglobalcompact.org/COP/analyzing_progress/expelled_ partici-
pants.html>; see also <http://www.environmentalleader.com/2012/03/28/ un-global-
compact-to-shake-out-more-free-riders-from-membership-ranks>.
127 Deva, supra note 5 at 293; Bauml, supra note 42 at 722.
128 Deva, supra note 5 at 298.
129 See online: <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/ in-
dex.html>. As will be seen below in the section on the GNI, vague standards are a
common critique of these type of initiatives.
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Compact’s goals.130 The principles do not sufficiently indicate how they can be
implemented by businesses with good aspirations,131 and can also “be manipulated
to include or exclude anything at the convenience of an individual corporate ac-
tor.”132 In order to positively affect corporate conduct surrounding human rights
issues, specificity is required as to the rights affected and the type(s) of conduct
desired.133
(ii) The Global Network Initiative134
The GNI is a multi-stakeholder initiative to improve the conduct of corporate
entities in the Internet and telecommunications sector regarding Internet users’
FOE and privacy. Founded in 2008, the GNI is the result of collaboration between
aforementioned corporate giants like Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft, and human
rights groups, academics, and various other stakeholders.135 The GNI outlines a set
of principles that are “intended to have global application and are grounded in in-
ternational human rights laws and standards.”136 Participants pledge to “respect
and protect the freedom of expression rights of their users” and the GNI also pro-
vides implementation guidelines to ensure the pledge is meaningfully and consist-
ently fulfilled,137 and the initiative employs a governing body that tracks and regu-
larly assesses participants’ progress and commitment to the initiative’s
principles.138 This body is explicitly designed to work directly with participants to
ensure complicity and continued improvement of business practices worldwide.139
The GNI is an innovative method by which the activities of international cor-
porate entities can be positively influenced in relation to FOE online. As with the
Compact, the fact that the GNI’s principles are based on established international
law documents like the UDHR and ICCPR ensures that participating businesses
will honour identifiable and universally accepted conceptions of FOE and privacy.
Additionally, the fact that the GNI provides implementation guidelines and then
tasks its members ensures that implementation of the initiative’s principles will oc-
cur in a reliable and uniform way. Moreover, this assessment mechanism guaran-
tees that the GNI will not suffer the same fate as the Compact and become “an
130 Deva, supra note 5 at 296.
131 Bauml, supra note 42 at 722.
132 Deva, supra note 5 at 296.
133 Sinden, supra note 59 at 505.
134 See online: <https://globalnetworkinitiative.org>.
135 MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 2253.
136 See online: <https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/corecommitments/index.php>.
137 See online: <https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/ in-
dex.php>; Bauml, supra note 42 at 718.
138 See online: <https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/governanceframework/ in-
dex.php>. MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 2873 describes this as a “rigorous external as-
sessment process — call it a ‘human rights audit’ — that aims to determine the extent
to which companies are actually upholding their commitments and to identify areas that
need improvement.”
139 MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 2870.
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empty public relations ploy.”140 Most advantageous, though, is the fact that the
GNI’s founding members include Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft. These three cor-
porate giants dominate the Internet and telecommunications sector, and their mere
participation would garner the GNI significant credibility; the fact that these com-
panies helped shape the GNI demonstrates a fundamental understanding of busi-
nesses’ perspective and endows the initiative with unmatched authority.
However, the GNI is not without problems and critics. In contrast to the Com-
pact, the GNI has not garnered significant support and as of April 2012 has only 32
participants; moreover, although the initiative purports to be an international one its
participants are primarily American.141 The GNI also has failed to attract any ma-
jor corporate participants beyond the aforementioned founding three, and has spe-
cifically been unable to “gain commitments from Internet giants like Twitter,
Facebook, Amazon.com, and Skype.”142 Without more support, both internation-
ally and from the business sector, the GNI will be reduced to merely an aspirational
set of policies enacted by three of the largest American Internet companies.
More unsettlingly, however, human rights organizations like Reporters With-
out Borders have also refused to support the GNI. Indeed, Amnesty International
participated in the formation of the GNI, but ultimately declined to participate, say-
ing that the initiative’s accountability measures were too weak.143 These types of
groups have distanced themselves from the GNI because it does not sufficiently
prohibit its participants from engaging in human rights violations. The language of
the implementation guidelines does not forbid participants from violating Internet
users’ FOE or privacy rights but rather asks them to avoid or minimize restrictions
“except in narrowly defined circumstances based on internationally recognized
laws or standards.”144 Although the GNI will advertise non-compliant companies
there are no real legal or economic penalties.145 Without more “teeth” the GNI will
fail both at effectively achieving its aims and attracting more support from the in-
ternational and human rights communities.
V. THE STATE OF THE DIGITAL NATION
(a) The Problems with Traditional CSR Implementation Models
Donald Kochan describes three broad categories of regulatory frameworks by
which CSR goals can be achieved: a) internally-induced, profit-driven/voluntary; b)
140 MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 2874.
141 See <https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/participants/index.php>.
142 Bauml, supra note 42 at 719; Evgeny Morozov, “Wiki Rehab: How to Save Julian
Assange’s Movement from Itself”, New Republic (7 January 2011), online:
<http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/81017/wikileaks-internet-pirate-party-save>.
143 Bobbie Johnson, “Amnesty criticises Global Network Initiative for online freedom of
speech”, The Guardian (30 October 2008), online: <http://www.guardian.
co.uk/technology/2008/oct/30/amnesty-global-network-initiative>.
144 MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 2855. Global Network Initiative Principles of Freedom of
Expression and Privacy — Freedom of Expression, online:
<https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/cms/uploads/1/GNI_-_Principles_1_.pdf>.
145 Bauml, supra note 42 at 720.
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non-coercive, pressure-induced/quasi-voluntary; and c) coercion-in-
duced/involuntary.146 The first category pertains to social responsibility initiatives
that corporations take on without external pressures. There is evidence of this
amongst the Internet corporate giants described in this article, such as Google’s
“Don’t Be Evil” philosophy.147 However, this framework implies a complete lack
of external regulatory elements and so business decisions are predominantly driven
by the self-interested desire to “maximize profits within the constraints of the
law.”148 Although CSR is possible within this framework it is subject to such aims
presenting an at least viable business opportunity. It would be fallacious to argue
that CSR could become standardized within this model149 and so it is insufficient
to address human rights concerns.150
The second category refers to responses to external impetus that falls short of
tangible force. Most contemporary CSR movements fall into this category, includ-
ing both the GNI and the Compact.151 These initiatives set voluntary aspirational
standards that corporate entities adopt for “protection and maintenance of the[ir]
brand or reputation” and in response “to public campaigns, boycotts, shaming tech-
niques, shakedowns, and other pressure tactics.”152 However, despite these tangible
motivations, CSR-oriented policies are not legally required under this framework,
and so corporate compliance is still fundamentally optional.
The problem with a framework that relies completely on voluntary CSR initia-
tives is that such enterprises can be ignored. Participation is not mandatory; there-
fore, if an initiative sets requirements that are too arduous — such as the implemen-
tation guidelines and regular assessments of the GNI — then it will fail to attract
members. Conversely, if the requirements for participants are not taxing enough
then the initiative risks becoming a mere bid for good publicity — as has been
demonstrated by the significant numbers of non-compliant Compact participants. In
either case the result is that voluntary CSR movements are ignored and fail to
achieve their purpose.
Moreover, since voluntary enterprises are not legal constructs they necessarily
lack traditional enforcement mechanisms. Because participation is voluntary under
146 Kochan, supra note 93 at 255–257.
147 See Google’s “Don’t Be Evil” philosophy, as described in their Corporate Code of
Conduct, online: <http://investor.google.com/corporate/code-of-conduct.html> and
Company Philosophy, online: <http://www.google.com/about/company/
tenthings.html>.
148 Kochan, supra note 93 at 255.
149 Even if all established corporate entities began operating in a CSR-oriented way, start-
ups would always see an opportunity to compete by engaging in less desirable — but
unprohibited — business practices.
150 Clapham, supra note 6: “human dignity must be protected in every circumstance.”
151 It should be noted that participation in efforts like the GNI and the Compact can in
theory be purely self-motivated and thereby fall into Kochan’s first category. However,
the prior conduct of GNI founders Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! as described in sec-
tion 3 of this article, as well as the general failure of the Compact to influence members
to consistently participate, indicates that this is often not the case.
152 Kochan, supra note 93 at 256.
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this framework, CSR organizations typically do not impose punishments as a
method of attracting members. So most initiatives do not have “teeth” to actually
enact change and can only really engage in dialogue with their participants and
with the public. Participant businesses can be encouraged to meet the initiative’s
standards and misconduct can be reported in the hope that external parties will re-
spond. Although this kind of reporting is certainly productive, its practical conse-
quences are debateable.153 Both the GNI and the Compact have been criticised for
not going far enough to impose substantive requirements on their participants.
However, without the abilities to both force businesses to participate and also pe-
nalize them for misconduct, CSR initiatives are powerless to do any more.
Interestingly, “the threat of litigation may be the type of pressure imposed”
under Kochan’s second category of CSR-oriented frameworks.154 This means that
human rights suits under the ATS would also qualify as non-coercive external pres-
sure. However, whether or not corporate entities can be held accountable for human
rights infringements will depend on the US Supreme Court’s final decision in Ki-
obel. Even if the ATS is capable of such use, it remains incapable of protecting free
expression on the Internet due to the problems associated with defining FOE in the
international law context. As a result of these caveats, the ATS proves insufficient
to address this article’s concerns with corporate censorship online.
The third category of involuntary, coercion-induced CSR implementation
presents a few immediate difficulties, namely deciding what standards to imple-
ment and determining how to enforce them. The vast multitude of different initia-
tives seeking to encourage varying standards — including both the Compact and
the GNI — shows how difficult it is to select any one formulation of CSR values.
The fact that most frameworks are based on international human rights law stan-
dards at least indicates a singular common impetus. However, there is still no one
definitive conception of how to apply such aims to private entities.
The larger problem of how to implement binding mechanisms for CSR ori-
ented goals has been discussed throughout this article. Attempts at the international
level, such as the Norms, have faced resistance from governmental and private enti-
ties alike. Additionally, the application of international law to private entities would
require a dramatic evolution of current international law. Implementing human
rights oriented CSR mechanisms at the domestic level would require a less progres-
sive approach to existing legal frameworks. However, this type of mechanism
comes with its own difficulties.
In addition to the problems associated with using the ATS for these types of
purposes, previous versions of GOFA were critiqued for the more fundamental is-
sue of giving too much power to state actors. As the examples in this article have
shown, even governments as protective of free speech as the US have engaged —
albeit indirectly — in the suppression of free speech online. In this context it be-
comes “difficult to expect that any government — no matter how democratic or
well intentioned it claims to be — can be fully trusted to prevent the violation of
153 See Cherie Metcalf, “Corporate Social Responsibility as Global Public Law: Third
Party Rankings as Regulation by Information” (2010-2011) 28 Pace Environmental
Law Review 145; see also Mulchinski, supra note 4.
154 Kochan, supra note 93 at 256.
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citizens’ rights caused by companies’ unaccountable and opaque compliance with
government demands.”155 There are good reasons to be suspicious of unilateral do-
mestic legislative initiatives that impose state-authorized CSR standards, and so
traditional endeavours in this vein — such as GOFA — have prompted at least as
much wariness as optimism.156
(b) A New Hope?
The latest version of GOFA addresses many of these concerns and presents the
best model yet for an enforceable CSR-oriented framework to protect FOE online.
As an American legislative initiative, GOFA hopes to set binding standards for all
businesses that operate publicly in the US. While this is clearly an involuntary,
coercion-induced framework, GOFA has been designed to flexibly incorporate vol-
untary, non-governmental CSR models like the GNI. The new “Safe Harbor” provi-
sions allow GOFA to both sets its own standards157 and also turn to third parties to
influence corporate conduct. This design addresses some of the key problems with
inherently voluntary frameworks like the GNI by indirectly giving them legal
“teeth.” Additionally, businesses are incentivised to adopt these voluntary models
as an alternative to government standards, which in turn removes some of the pres-
sure on multi-stakeholder initiatives to tailor their requirements so as to attract
participation.
GOFA’s new design also addresses some of the major problems associated
with involuntary frameworks. Instead of compelling businesses to meet a single,
government-set CSR standard, the proposed legislation explicitly allows the same
requirement to be fulfilled by participation in approved multi-stakeholder initia-
tives. In addition to accommodating a theoretically infinite range of perspectives on
CSR goals, this also reduces the government’s control over the achievement of
such objectives. The fact that GOFA gives businesses the option to participate in
third party initiatives substantially reduces the degree to which the bill expands the
US government’s authority over how CSR should be implemented, as compared to
previous versions of GOFA and other similar initiatives. In theory this quality
should lessen the risk of government-corporate collaborations158 and allow govern-
mental and private entities to cooperate in limiting corporate accountability.
Moreover, the latest version of GOFA seeks to achieve its goals by taking
advantage of a well-established enforcement regime — the SEC. By integrating
CSR-oriented requirements into the presently existing regulatory framework for
businesses, GOFA extends rather than transforms domestic legislation. This design
has the intertwined effects of better accommodating the current business law
frameworks and increasing the likelihood that GOFA could actually become law.
155 MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 2764.
156 Ibid: “Because government is often part of the problem even in democracies, corporate
collusion in government surveillance and censorship is unlikely to be solved by the
passage and enforcement of laws, even by the most well-intentioned and democratic of
governments.”
157 See GOFA, supra note 76.
158 Birnhack, supra note 30.
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However, these advantages should not be celebrated without consideration of
the problems still facing the latest version of GOFA. The fact that GOFA only ap-
plies to businesses that operate in countries that the US State Department has desig-
nated as “Internet Restricting” remains a continuing problem from earlier drafts of
the bill. Many have asked how well this design responds to political realities, as
well as the specific context of the Internet, given how quickly standards and values
can change.159 Moreover, this points to the larger problem of the State Depart-
ment’s continued authority over GOFA’s scope, since the government branch indi-
rectly decides which corporations must be subject to the bill’s binding legal
implications.
Most fundamentally, however, GOFA remains a domestic US legal initiative
and so its applicability is restricted to those companies that have a presence in the
US. Although this limited scope will give the bill authority over a substantial num-
ber of important Internet service and content providers, it is nonetheless a serious
limitation. Moreover it could pose future problems if impacted companies found it
was in their best interests to simply relocate their bases of operations in order to
escape GOFA’s scope. This kind of danger is increased by the fact that GOFA only
impacts companies that are publicly traded within the US. As such it sets up a
divide between public and private companies that could in theory encourage more
corporations to remain private in order to avoid the bill’s CSR requirements. This
problem is especially significant when one considers that not all Internet giants are
publicly traded even today, with Facebook’s initial public offering still forthcoming
as of this writing.
Finally, the fact that GOFA specifically incorporates the GNI in its “Safe Har-
bor” provisions has a dimension that could prove detrimental to both the proposed
law and the multi-stakeholder initiative. Being limited to North America in scope is
a problem that is both inherently true of GOFA and, as described above, has been
levelled as a critique against the GNI. In comparing the initiative to an earlier ver-
sion of GOFA, Bauml writes: “The GNI also needs more international presence
than it currently has, in order to avoid looking merely like GOFA in disguise rather
than a global code of conduct for companies.”160 Although the GNI could still
achieve such international support, its embrace in GOFA does emphasize the North
American focus that currently plagues the initiative. As such, although the “Safe
Harbor” provision does give legislative encouragement to multi-stakeholder initia-
tives, it could also serve to further isolate and “American-ize” the GNI contrary to
its goals.
These issues with GOFA may well be addressed in a future revision to the bill,
or they may remain inherent limitations to the bill whether it ends up as law or not.
At this point both the proposed legislation and the GNI, as well as their underlying
goals, would be furthered by a few alterations to the existing bill. First, it would
help if the bill was less specifically geared towards so-called “Internet restricting”
159 MacKinnon, supra note 2 at 2763: “What happens in cases where, for example, a coun-
try was democratic last week, then experienced a coup and suddenly became a military
dictatorship overnight? Since that country would not be on the State Department’s list,
companies would not be held legally accountable for behavior there.”
160 Bauml, supra note 42 at 720.
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countries and more focused on all companies that provide Internet related services.
This would give it a broader scope in protecting FOE online internationally, and
would deemphasize the role of the US State Department. Additionally, GOFA
would be more capable of achieving its goals if it were bindingly applicable to non-
publicly traded companies. However, given the benefits associated with incorporat-
ing the SEC as an enforcement mechanism, it is not clear how such an objective
could be fulfilled without taking away from what is currently one of GOFA’s great-
est assets. Finally, it would greatly help both GOFA and the GNI for the former to
incorporate explicit mention of at least one more initiative that stands as an exam-
ple of the type of multi-stakeholder approach advocated by the bill. This would
help GOFA by further demonstrating the kind of corporate standards it calls for,
and it would likewise help the GNI by less directly aligning it with the US domestic
law. However, it is not immediately apparent which multi-stakeholder initiative
should or even could be added to GOFA, as the implementation guidelines that
make the GNI an ideal model also set it apart from most comparable endeavours.
However, even without these changes, the current model of GOFA is a signifi-
cant positive step for FOE online and CSR initiatives. If nothing else it represents a
historic evolution of existing CSR implementation frameworks, and shows that
there are still creative energies focused on solving the problematic unaccountability
of the corporate owners of the Internet.
(c) If Not The Right Solution Then At Least The Right Direction
Kinley, Nolan and Zerial argue that before the UN Norms were drafted, any
discussion of corporations and human rights law was “stalled and largely focused
on the pros and cons of establishing and monitoring codes of conduct.”161 Based on
the historical development of the UN Norms described above, the conversation ap-
pears to have come full circle: international discourse about corporations and
human rights law is once again focused on voluntary codes for corporate social
responsibility. There has been consistent and widespread resistance — from corpo-
rate entities and governments alike — to the concept of binding international law
obligations for private actors. This was the fundamental reason behind the failure of
the Norms162 and likewise this hesitancy has contributed to and been echoed by the
development of the case law surrounding the ATS.
The main advantage of the Norms would have been the establishment of an
international law precedent for holding corporate entities accountable for human
rights violations. Regardless of how effective they may have proven in terms of
acceptance or implementation by the international community, their adoption in
any form would have been a positive acknowledgement that corporate entities
should and can be expected to follow international human rights law standards.
This would have been an important step forward in holding such entities accounta-
ble in any forum, and would likely have influenced the development of the ATS.
Even if only symbolic in nature, the Norms would have declared that the “con-
161 Kinley Nolan Zerial, supra note 60 at 460.
162 Ibid. at 462: “One of the reasons the Norms have engendered such controversy . . . is
that they . . . posit a system whereby international law responds directly and forcefully
to corporate action that violates [human rights].”
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science of the world”163 abhors violations of human rights by any party, including
private actors. As it stands not even such a figurative victory can be claimed.
However, the latest version of GOFA seems poised to move the conversation
forward once again into unfamiliar — though perhaps more viable — territory. Al-
though the failure of the Norms indicates a distressingly broad resistance to any
expansion of international human rights law to apply to private entities, the increas-
ing potential of GOFA shows that hope yet remains for the legal institutionalization
of human rights oriented models for regulating corporate activity. The growing rec-
ognition and respect for, and consequently power of, private multi-stakeholder ini-
tiatives like the GNI shows that corporate social responsibility is gaining legal trac-
tion in spite of international hesitancy. No longer existing merely in a liminal space
between policy and law on the periphery of politics, the GNI’s inclusion in GOFA
demonstrates that private initiatives could attain mandatory and tangible legal ef-
fect, at least at a domestic level. Although the GNI and GOFA must continue to
exist parallel to one another in order to maintain both their individual and collective
strengths, this convergence of voluntary and legally enforceable CSR implementa-
tion mechanisms is an innovative evolution of existing legal frameworks.
It is still too soon to say whether or not this tentative step towards embracing
online speech-oriented CSR as binding will ultimately prove to be a positive devel-
opment — or even whether it will actually happen. However, what can be ascer-
tained is that this new avenue for influencing corporate attitudes is a positive —
and potentially monumental — development for human rights, and particularly for
FOE online.
VI. A PEOPLE’S REVOLUTION?
In addition to this ongoing discourse, there are also other forces outside the
legal community pushing for increased corporate accountability in accordance with
international human rights norms. For example, the positive work being done by
multinational Internet corporations themselves should not be ignored. As Bauml
argues, “while it is important to ensure that these ICPs are not adding to the prob-
lem, what we really need to be concerned with is achieving change in the long
term.”164 Numerous corporations have been doing just that, even without the bind-
ing legal impetus that GOFA or the Norms would provide. For example, Google’s
presence in China has significantly improved FOE in that country, as their trans-
parency policies and mid-2010 rejection of self-censorship have tested the Chinese
government’s willingness to sacrifice lucrative western business for the sake of the
Great Firewall.165 Similarly, Twitter also recently implemented a transparency pol-
icy that has been hailed166 for demonstrating that the company respects and is will-
163 Smith, supra note 8 at 38.
164 Bauml, supra note 42 at 730.
165 Ibid. at 732.
166 Josh Catone, “Relax: Twitter’s New Censorship Policy is Actually Good for Activists”,
Mashable (27 January 2012), online: <http://mashable.com/2012/01/27/twitter-censor-
ship-activism>; Craig Blaha, “Twitter’s Country Specific Censorship May be Good for
Human Rights”, Technorati (30 January 2012), online: <http://technorati.com/social-
media/article/twitters-country-specific-censorship-may-be>.
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ing to defend FOE online.167 Furthermore, the GNI was itself founded as a result of
initiative from Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft, and this article has explored how
that initiative is among the most important global political and legal projects to
improve corporate accountability online. Regardless of their previous conduct, cor-
porate entities like these ones are nevertheless proving to be an instrumental posi-
tive force in protecting FOE on the Internet.
Moreover there are also signs of resistance against corporate and governmen-
tal control from the netizens themselves: the worldwide users of the Internet. The
Arab Spring is a groundbreaking example of how global citizens can challenge op-
pression at large, both on and via the Internet. In a similar vein, the success of the
protests on January 12, 2012, against the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)
and PROTECT IP Act (PIPA) demonstrates both the collective strength of the on-
line community and the willingness of corporate actors to support them. Opposition
for the two bills began on social websites like reddit and Tumblr and grew to en-
compass corporate entities such as Google and Wikipedia, and ultimately the pro-
tests changed the minds of US Senators and brought and end to the proposed
laws.168
MacKinnon describes her “Magna Carta moment” as merely the first step in a
long process, ultimately culminating in an “American Revolution”-style break from
the Internet governance status quo.169 Although she says such developments are
still a long way off, corporate and common citizens alike have demonstrated that
the energy and desire for a revolution in Internet governance already exists. What is
needed now is an amalgamation of these popular and progressive forces with the
authority of sovereign power. The “Safe Harbor” provisions in the latest version of
GOFA are the best tangible realization of such a union that has been proposed, and
demonstrate that there is a real possibility for change on the horizon. However, it
remains to be seen whether the combined strength of GOFA’s legislative support-
ers, companies like Google and Twitter, and netizens can overcome the corporate
and governmental conservatism that defeated the Norms. Only a global reassess-
ment of the mutually constitutive power dynamics between citizens, states, and pri-
vate corporate owners can facilitate the realization of rights like freedom of expres-
sion in the online “public space.”
167 @twitter, “Tweets must still flow”, twitter blog (26 January 2012), online:
<http://blog.twitter.com/2012/01/tweets-still-must-flow.html>.
168 Jenna Wortham, “Public Outcry Over Antipiracy Bills Began as Grass-Roots Grum-
bling”, The New York Times (20 January 2012), online:
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